La distinción metodológica entre el lenguaje teórico y el lenguaje observacional: un análisis epistemológico

• Autores: Damián Islas Mondragón
• Localización: Andamios: revista de investigación social, ISSN 2594-1917, ISSN-e 1870-0063, Nº. 31, 2016, págs. 37-59
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.29092/uacm.v13i31.426
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The methodological distinction between theoretical language and observational language: an epistemological analysis
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    En este artículo analizo los principales argumentos y contraargumentos realistas y antirrealistas que se han construido a favor y en contra de la capacidad científica para producir conocimiento objetivo y verdadero acerca del mundo social y natural. Argumento que el lenguaje teórico y el lenguaje observacional con el que los científicos sociales y naturales se refieren a las diversas entidades, fenómenos, propiedades y procesos científicos observables e inobservables están determinados, en la práctica, por sus tradiciones teóricas de investigación, lo cual muestra que la metodología científica depende en cierta medida de las teorías que son, a lo sumo, un proceder constructivo y no un proceder de descubrimiento.

  • English

    In this paper I analyze the main arguments and counterarguments proposed by realists and anti-realists stances for and against the scientific ability to produce objective and true scientific knowledge about the social and natural world. I argue that the theoretical and observational language which social and natural scientists use to refer to several scientific observable and unobservable entities, phenomena, properties and processes are determined, in practice, by their theoretical research traditions. This shows that scientific methodology depends so heavily on scientific theories that is, at most, a constructive procedure and not a discovery procedure.

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