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La importante STJUE 21 diciembre 2016 ha resuelto, tras la sorpresa que supuso el parecer contrario de las conclusiones del Abogado General de julio de 2016, que la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo español vulnera el art. 6 de la Directiva 93/13/CEE, de manera que las cláusulas suelo declaradas abusivas por falta de transparencia se ven afectadas por una nulidad ex tunc y, por tanto, procede la devolución de todas las cantidades indebidamente percibidas, sin límites temporales. El presente comentario argumenta que el TJUE actuó con acierto técnico (no exento de riesgos futuros) y dentro de su competencia en punto a establecer el carácter retroactivo de dicha nulidad; pero, en cambio, se extralimitó en sus funciones al sostener que le corresponde a él y no a los Estados Miembros delimitar cuáles son las consecuencias de infringir el deber de transparencia (arts. 4.2 y 5 de la Directiva) y, en particular, al considerar que la sanción se encuentra igualmente en el art. 6 de la Directiva, por lo que una cláusula no transparente puede equivaler a una cláusula abusiva. La STJUE 26 enero 2017 acaba de abundar en la forma de operar ese control de abusividad por falta de transparencia.
The influential CJUE judgment of 21 December 2016 has vanished the initial shock produced by the different opinion given by the Advocate General in July 2016 and has overruled the Spanish Supreme Court’s case law, since it is considered as opposed to article 6 of Directive 93/13/EC. As a result, the meaning of the unfairness of the so called “floor clauses”, when it was due to a failure to comply with the duty of transparency, is a full nullity ex tunc, and therefore entails a restitutory effect of all not to be due but paid amounts, without fixing any time limit for the restitution. This paper argues that the CJUE acted with right technical criteria (not exempt of future risks) and within its own competence as for the retroactive feature of nullity. However, the CJUE ruled ultra vires, beyond its own functions, when it sustained that Member States are not competent (but the CJUE itself) to shape the consequences of the infringement of the transparency test (arts. 4.2 and 5 of the Directive) and, in particular, when the Court considers that the remedy to the lack of transparency is also located in article 6 of the Directive, identifying a non transparent term with an unfair term. Ultimately, the CJUE judgment of 26 January 2017 has just gone even further in the way the unfairness test by lack of transparency should work.
