It is useful to consider the interlocks according to the type of board member (executive or non-executive) who posseses them? Their effect on firm performance

• Autores: L. Pérez-Calero, M. Carmen Barroso Castro
• Localización: Revista europea de dirección y economía de la empresa, ISSN 1019-6838, Vol. 24, Nº 3, 2015, págs. 130-137
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1016/j.redee.2015.04.001
• Títulos paralelos:
  • ¿Es útil diferenciar a los interlocks de acuerdo con el tipo de consejero (ejecutivo o no ejecutivo) que los posee? Su influencia sobre el rendimiento de la empresa
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• Resumen
  • español

    Partiendo de los supuestos de la teoría de dependencia de recursos, el principal objetivo de esta investigación pasa por conocer cómo y de qué forma la pertenencia de los consejeros a múltiples consejos (interlocks) podría afectar a la rentabilidad de la empresa y si es importante considerar en esta relación la procedencia de los interlocks según la tipología del consejero que lo ostente (consejeros ejecutivos y no ejecutivos). Mediante un análisis de datos de panel dinámico (GMM), y a través de una muestra de 88 empresas cotizadas en el Mercado Continuo español para el periodo 2005–2008, los resultados obtenidos confirman que existe una relación curvilínea (en forma de U invertida) entre los interlocks y el rendimiento de la empresa, y que esta relación es sólo significativa si tenemos en cuenta el número total de vínculos externos, y no sólo cuando tomamos en número de vínculos generados por los consejeros no-ejecutivos. Asimismo, podemos afirman que el grado de familiaridad y conocimiento mutuo entre los miembros del consejo (medido por la permanencia media del consejo) influye sobre esta relación.

  • English

    Taking the assumptions of the resource dependency theory as our starting point, the main objective of this investigation is to gain an understanding of how and in what way board members who serve on multiple boards (interlocks) can affect a firm's profitability, and whether it is useful to consider the derivation of these interlocks according to the type of board member (executive or non-executive) who possesses them. Using dynamic panel data analysis (GMM) and a sample of 88 firms quoted on the Spanish Continuous Market for the period 2005–2008, our results confirm the existence of a curvilinear (inverted-U) relation between interlocks and firm performance. The results demonstrate that this relation is only significant if we include the total number of external ties rather than just the number of links generated by non-executive directors. We can also confirm that the degree of familiarity and shared knowledge between board members (measured by average board tenure) affects this relationship.

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