Acceso usuarios
Javier Rodríguez Díez
Este comentario analiza una reciente sentencia que considera que la cláusula de haberse pagado el precio en la compraventa impide que el vendedor pruebe que, en realidad, no recibió el precio. El fallo se apoya en las palabras “no se admitirá prueba alguna en contrario” del art. 1876, el cual es considerado aplicable entre las partes en tanto reflejaría el valor probatorio de los instrumentos públicos consagrado en el art. 1700. Se comenta críticamente esta decisión, ya que el art. 1876 asigna ciertos efectos a la cláusula de haberse pagado el precio únicamente respecto de terceros, como se desprende no solo de su tenor literal, sino, también, de las fuentes que lo inspiraron. Se critica, asimismo, el valor probatorio que el fallo concede a los instrumentos públicos, así como las consecuencias prácticas que de ello se siguen para el tráfico comercial cotidiano.
This commentary analyses a recent decision which held that, if the parties at the sale declare that the price has been paid, the seller will not be able to prove that he did not really receive the price. The decision relies on the wording “no proof will be admitted against this” of art. 1876, which is deemed applicable to the relationship between the parties inasmuch as it would bear witness to the evidentiary value of public instruments laid down in art. 1700. The commentary criticises this decision, since art. 1876 grants certain consequences to the clause that the price has been paid only regarding third parties, as can be seen not only in the wording of this article, but also in the sources which inspired it. The commentary also criticises the evidentiary value which the decision grants to public instruments, as well as the practical consequences which this brings along for everyday commercial practice.
