Acceso usuarios
Salisu Ogbo Usman, Enojo Kennie Enojo, John Sule Ujah, Venatus Kakwagh, Isaach Utenwojo Ocholi, Obi Success Esomchi
Purpose: This study examines political party financing and voting behaviour in north-central Nigeria, with particular focus on the level of financing in the region, the underlining motivations for such financing, and insight into the benefits or otherwise of political party financing on governance and development in the region vis-à-vis electoral process credibility.
Theoretical framework: Electoral window in Nigeria political terrain is conceived by the elite as investment venture of which profit is to be maximized by means of exchange of electorates voting power for money, entrenchment of poverty and by extension hold the electoral system to hostage via manipulation, corruption and election irregularities and weak judicial system. According to the investment and social exchange theory, the political class are to business of investment for profit and exchange of services (voting power/vote buying) transaction politics for elite interest aggregation and articulation.
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study uses using survey and in-depth interview. The research work was carried out across three dominant political parties in north-central Nigeria, namely the All Progressive Congress (APC), People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and Labour Party (LP), in the north-central geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The research follows three stages of random sampling. Stage one involves the random sampling or selection of two local governments across Benue, the Plateau, and Nassarawa, totaling six units of study. Stage two involves the random selection of two council wards from each of the six (6) identified focus areas, for a total of twelve (12) council wards. Stage three involves the selection of 18 respondents from each unit sampled, making a total of 216 respondents for the study. The study made use of descriptive statistics (Graphs) to analyse the data obtained from a field survey and interview analysed thematically. However, 200 questionnaires were valid for analysis after two weeks of administering the questionnaire.
Findings: Findings reveal that unregulated political party financing undermines Nigeria electoral process vis-à-vis electoral credibility. It promotes political patronage and clientele networks; thus, political or electoral funders control and select politicians, thereby sacrificing good governance and development. Excessive and unregulated financing breaks the link between the electorate and politicians, leading to unequal participation, making it difficult for new political forces to emerge. Politicians with large resources often give preferential treatment to their backers, and politicians abuse their access to state resources to maintain power which in turns undermines the electoral process due to transactional (party with big money bags wins’ election) political nature in Nigeria.
Research, Practical & Social implications: This study shows that political elites has weaponized transactional politics and corruption to hold on to power and by extension undermines the electoral process which in turns gave rise to bad governance, corruption and poverty in Nigeria and Nigeria is currently suffering from institutional fragility (INEC) and if proactive measures is not taken to suppress these menace in Nigeria political landscape, the country is heading to banana republic. This study helps policymakers to be in the know of the impending disaster that awaits Nigeria in the near future if proactive measures are not taking to quell this menace of transactional politics.
Originality/Value: The findings suggest several consequences for the electoral processes in Nigeria and by extension Africa on how eexcessive political party financing affects the performances of eventual winners and electoral outcomes and this transactional politics does not does not benefit the north-central zone as it concerns service delivery oriented governance and development.
