Un dilema para el enfoque de Rodríguez-Blanco del seguimiento intencional de reglas

• Yohan Molina ^[1]
  1. [1] Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

     Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

     Santiago, Chile

     
• Localización: Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, ISSN-e 2386-4702, ISSN 0214-8676, Nº 47, 2023, págs. 469-482
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.14198/DOXA2023.47.17
• Títulos paralelos:
  • A Dilemma for Rodriguez-Blanco’s Approach to Intentional Rule-Following
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    De acuerdo con la explicación del seguimiento intencional de reglas jurídicas propuesta por Verónica RodríguezBlanco, el agente que obedece intencionalmente una regla lo hace porque concibe su valor a partir de la asunción de razones o fines fundamentales que la justificarían. Según la autora, esta idea implicaría que la noción raziana de razón excluyente impide que las reglas jurídicas puedan ser obedecidas intencionalmente. En esta breve nota señalaré que la cotribución de Rodríguez-Blanco no pareciera poder dar cuenta apropiadamente de la relevancia de las reglas para nuestras determinaciones prácticas, y que su posible solución a este problema se enfrenta al siguiente dilema: o es incoherente con una lectura restringida de su concepción del seguimiento intencional de reglas, o es coherente con una lectura amplia de dicha concepción, pero esta lectura implicaría que la crítica a las razones excluyentes es improcedente. Finalmente, agregaré que una lectura restríngida parece injustificada frente a una amplia, lo que forzaría a Rodríguez-Blanco a aceptar los daños asociados al segundo cuerno del dilema.

  • English

    According to Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco’s account of intentional rule-following, an agent who intentionally obeys a legal rule conceives of its value from the assumption of grounding reasons that would justify it. On her view, this explanation would imply that the notion of exclusionary reason prevents rules from being followed intentionally. In this brief note, I will point out that Rodriguez-Blanco’s contribution does not seem to be able to account for the relevance of rules in our practical determinations, and that her possible solution to this problem will face the following dilemma: either it is incoherent with a restricted reading of her conception of intentional rule-following or it is coherent with a wide reading of that conception, but then her criticism of exclusionary reasons is unfounded. Finally, I will add that the restricted reading seems unjustified in the face of the wider one, which would force Rodríguez-Blanco to accept the damages associated to the second horn.

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