The specific evidence rule. Reference classes — individuals — personal autonomy

• Autores: Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou
• Localización: Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, ISSN-e 2604-6202, Nº. 4, 2023, págs. 11-37
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • This paper grapples with the issue of naked statistical evidence in general and the reference class problem (RCP) in particular. By analysing the reasoning patterns underlying the RCP, I will show, first, that the RCP rests on theoretical presuppositions which we are by no means bound to accept. Such a presupposition is, what I will call, the wholesale approach in decision-making. Secondly, I will show that the very effort to increase the level of precision to a maximum so that a reference class contains a single member only is theoretically inconsistent insofar, as it deprives reference classes of their general (and thus scientific) character. Thereupon, I will argue, thirdly, that the decision to enact a specific evidence rule is a political one and reflects deep moral and jurisprudential values, not scientific propositions. Such a value is personal autonomy, which I go on to illuminate briefly. Whether the trier of fact will treat cases in a wholesale approach or not depends on constitutional arrangements and legal values putting emphasis on the individual and the latter’s dignity.

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