Acceso usuarios
Daniel Blinder, Maximiliano Vila Seoane
En el marco de un contexto internacional en transformación, donde las disputas geopolíticas entre grandes potencias se han acentuado, la literatura de Relaciones Internacionales ha prestado creciente atención al rol de la ciencia y la tecnología. La mayoría de esta literatura examina las capacidades de los países centrales en su carrera por dominar tecnologías estratégicas y/o emergentes, con especial énfasis en la creciente rivalidad entre China y EEUU. No obstante, la literatura le ha prestado menos atención a cómo esta competencia por la supremacía tecnológica incide en las estrategias de adquisición de capacidades y/o de desarrollo tecnológico de países de menores recursos. El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo conceptualizar las presiones internacionales realizadas por un estado sobre otro estado, para que no obtenga ni desarrolle capacidades tecnológicas transferidas por otro estado, sea este rival o no lo sea. En particular, se sostiene que las presiones internacionales contra la cooperación científico-tecnológica suelen involucrar una mezcla de uso de encuadres coercitivos, engaño, hostigamiento diplomático, diplomacia pública mediada, y sanciones, pero muchas veces el efecto de las presiones internacionales puede ser limitado. Para ilustrar esta propuesta conceptual, se analiza el caso de las presiones de EEUU sobre Argentina para evitar la construcción de una planta nuclear de diseño chino, denominada Hualong One o HPR1000. El estudio de caso se basa en el análisis cualitativo de fuentes primarias, como documentos oficiales y entrevistas semiestructuradas, y de otras fuentes secundarias pertinentes. Específicamente, el estudio sintetiza la cooperación nuclear entre Argentina y China entre 2012-2022, y detalla las presiones estadounidenses realizadas durante la administración Macri (2015-2019) y la administración Fernández (2019-2022). El análisis de este caso ilustra la conceptualización de presiones internacionales propuesta, en particular, los datos recabados muestran que las presiones estadounidenses contra la cooperación nuclear entre Argentina y China fueron realizadas por intermedio de hostigamiento diplomático, encuadre engañoso, y diplomacia pública mediada. Estas presiones han tenido el propósito de acabar con la cooperación en temas que son de interés para EEUU. No obstante, si el objetivo de máxima de la diplomacia estadounidense fue propiciar la cancelación del proyecto, las presiones parecen no haber sido exitosas. Sin embargo, si suponemos que buscaron retrasarlo, en tal caso, dado que desde el inicio de las negociaciones en 2012, aún no se ha iniciado la planta nuclear, se puede suponer que fueron un factor que incidió en esta demora.
In the context of a changing international environment, where geopolitical disputes between great powers have intensified, the International Relations literature has paid increasing attention to the role of science and technology. Most of this literature examines the capabilities of great powers in their race to dominate strategic and/or emerging technologies, with special emphasis on the rivalry between China and the US. However, this literature has paid less attention to how this new competition for technological supremacy affects the acquisition of technological capabilities and/or technology development strategies of Global South states.The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize the international pressure exerted by one state on another state to prevent it from obtaining and developing technological capabilities transferred by another state, whether it is a rival or not of the former. It is argued that international pressures are a process over time, which are exercised in at least five ways: coercive framing, deception, diplomatic harassment, mediated public diplomacy, and sanctions. Although several of the aforementioned means to exert pressure may also be conducted against different types of projects, we think these are more frequent in science and technology cooperation projects, where coercion in the military sense is not, for the time being, the most usual practice against them.To illustrate this conceptual approach, this paper analyzes the case of US pressures on Argentina to prevent nuclear cooperation projects with China. This case is relevant to the extent that Argentina is a Southern Cone country, a region historically influenced by the US, but which has recently developed closer scientific and technological cooperation ties with China. Also, Argentina has certain levels of industrialization and scientific and technological capabilities in several sectors in dispute between the US and China.The case study is based on the analysis of qualitative information gathered on the one hand from official documents,Argentine media outlets articles and other relevant secondary sources. On the other hand, the analysis is based on the collection of original primary sources obtained via in-person semi-structured interviews with Argentine public officials and nuclear companies’ managers involved in cooperation projects with China in the nuclear energy sector. These sources were analyzed to identify the types of pressures exerted by US public officials against the cooperation with China, and to trace their potential effects from the viewpoint of the involved Argentine stakeholders.The results are presented in three sections. The first one synthesizes the main features of the nuclear programs in Argentina and China, narrating the start of their nuclear cooperation projects. Since 2012, Argentina and China signed a series of nuclear cooperation treaties, which in November 2015 culminated in the signing of agreements for the construction of the fourth and fifth nuclear power plants in the country. The fourth power plant was to follow the Canadian CANDU-type nuclear reactor design, a technology that Argentina masters, and which operates with heavy water and natural uranium. On the other hand, the fifth plant would be built following the indigenous Chinese ACP-1000 design, later rebranded Hualong One or HPR1000, which would operate with enriched uranium and light water.The second section examines how these projects unfolded during the Macri administration (2015-2019). During this period, the evidence collected indicates the start of the US pressure against the nuclear power plant projects between Argentina and China. This was made particularly through diplomatic harassment, where a misleading frame was communicated to Argentine government officials. Nonetheless, according to the sources we consulted, the pressure was not of high intensity. During the Macri administration, Argentine public officials decided to cancel one of the nuclear plant projects, the CANDU nuclear power plant. Argentine policy makers made this decision not due to US pressures, but because of the scarcity of resources for the project in the context of the country’s financial crisis, as well as by their opposition to this type of technology. Meanwhile, they decided to continue with the Hualong One nuclear power plant project.The third section analyzes the Fernández administration (2019-2022), a period during which the US intensified the pressure against the remaining nuclear power plant project between Argentina and China. The section cites the testimonies of government officials and managers of the Argentine nuclear company that suffered this pressure, and exemplifies how the US complemented diplomatic harassment with the use of a deceptive framing and mediated public diplomacy as pressure tools. The government sources that we consulted explained that these pressures caused the delay of the nuclear plant project with China, because part of the ruling coalition sided with the US position, and prevented the advancement of the financial part of the agreement.The analysis of this case illustrates the proposed conceptualization of international pressures. The collected data especially records that US pressures against nuclear cooperation projects between Argentina and China were carried out through diplomatic harassment, deceptive framing, and mediated public diplomacy. These pressures have been aimed at ending cooperation on issues that are of interest to the US. However, if the end goal of US diplomacy was to bring about the cancellation of the nuclear power plant project between Argentina and China, the pressure appears to have been unsuccessful. Instead, if we assume that they sought to delay the construction of the nuclear power plant, in this case, since the project has not yet started after its initial announcement of 2015, it can be concluded that US pressure was a relevant factor in such an outcome.In sum, the contribution of this article serves as an input for academics and public policy makers in analyzing and/or implementing science and technology projects in a context of intensified US-China rivalry. Indeed, the results of this article suggest that Global South states must take into account the potential international pressures against its science and technology cooperation projects with foreign partners, especially when they are relevant to the agenda of great powers involved in rivalry. Although the case analyzed has focused on the nuclear sector, we think that the proposed conceptualization of international pressures developed in this article can be applied to examine numerous others where such practices have been taking place, such as the space sector, 5G and telecommunications, the military sector, biotechnology, among others. Future research could extend the study of international pressures on scientific and technological cooperation projects between great powers and states of the Global South by comparing how they were exerted in different sectors, and with what outcomes.
