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El presente artículo hace un balance de la respuesta de las organizaciones regionales latinoamericanas y caribeñas al covid-19. En especial, se pregunta si éstas han contribuido a hacer frente a la pandemia y se busca encontrar explicaciones para la considerable divergencia entre las respuestas de nueve organizaciones regionales. En ese orden de ideas, en primer lugar, se señala que el regionalismo latinoamericano ya se encontraba en crisis antes de la llegada del covid-19. Algunas de las características de esta crisis eran: una decreciente regionalización económica, una creciente polarización política regional, y la parálisis y la desintegración de algunas organizaciones regionales como la UNASUR. Es por eso que se argumenta que las expectativas con respecto al desempeño de las organizaciones regionales eran bastante bajas. Posteriormente, combinando fuentes académicas y primarias, se hace una valoración de las acciones desplegadas por cada organización frente a la pandemia del covid-19. Estas acciones se dividen en tres para su evaluación: el compartir información, la coordinación interestatal y la acción colectiva (interna y externa). En esa valoración se obtuvieron resultados mixtos: hubo algunas organizaciones que tuvieron un buen desempeño y otras que tuvieron un bajo rendimiento, en especial si se tienen en cuenta sus mandatos fundacionales y la totalidad de sus capacidades institucionales. En segundo lugar, con base en la literatura sobre organizaciones internacionales y regionales se propone que son cuatro las variables que tienen mayor poder explicativo para dar cuenta de la divergencia de esas respuestas de las instituciones regionales a la pandemia: la diferenciación funcional, la autonomía de las organizaciones, el liderazgo y el conocimiento (know-how) acumulado. En tercer lugar, el artículo deriva unas lecciones más generales para el regionalismo latinoamericano de estas respuestas regionales al covid-19 (y de la ausencia de éstas en algunos casos). Se defiende la idea de que un regionalismo más técnico, diferenciado funcionalmente y segmentado puede resistir mejor los embates de la polarización ideológica y los inevitables cambios de ciclo político en América Latina. Especialmente, si se compara con los riesgos de parálisis y crisis de organizaciones “sombrilla” que abarcan una gran multiplicidad de temas a través de numerosos consejos u otro tipo de subunidades.
This article takes stock of the response of Latin American and Caribbean regional organizations to Covid-19. It asks whether they have contributed to addressing the pandemic. It proposes explanations for the considerable divergence between the responses of nine regional organizations: the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Andean Community (AC), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Pacific Alliance (PA), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Forum for the Progress and Integration of South America (PROSUR), and the Central American Integration System (SICA). In other words, Latin American regional institutions are analyzed as an independent variable influencing national governments’ responses and crisis management during the pandemic.
In that order of ideas, first, it is pointed out that Latin American regionalism was already in crisis before the arrival of Covid-19. Some of the characteristics of this crisis were: a decreasing economic regionalization, a growing regional political polarization, a lack of leadership, and the paralysis and/or disintegration of some regional organizations such as CELAC and UNASUR. In addition, these elements have also aggravated historical structural weaknesses of Latin American regionalism, such as intergovernmentalism and inter-presidentialism, which have given impetus to regional integration in times of ideological affinities but sometimes have also paralyzed and set it back in times of divergence and lack of leadership. For these reasons, it is argued that expectations regarding the performance of regional organizations during the pandemic were quite low.
Subsequently, combining academic and primary sources, the article provides an assessment of the actions deployed by each organization in the face of the covid-19 pandemic. Based on a categorization previously proposed in the academic literature, which we apply to more cases and test on a broader empirical basis, these actions are divided into three types for their evaluation: information pooling, interstate coordination, and collective action (internal and external). Information pooling refers to an organization’s ability to provide and centralize data, knowledge, and expertise. Interstate coordination encompasses actions aimed at jointly organizing the movement of goods, services, people, and the distribution of medical supplies. Collective action refers to actions that involve combining national resources or using shared resources to achieve common goals. It is subdivided into external or internal depending on whether the actors involved in the action, or the objective of the action, are internal or external to the organization itself. Mixed results were obtained in assessing the organizations based on this typology of the actions deployed. Some organizations performed well, and others performed poorly, especially if their constituent mandates and the totality of their institutional capacities are taken into account.
In the second part of the article, based on the academic literature on international and regional organizations and analyzing the nine cases under study, we argue that structure, mandate(s), and past experiences of regional institutions matter. Further, four variables have the most explanatory power to account for the divergence of the responses of regional institutions to the pandemic: functional differentiation, organizational autonomy, leadership, and accumulated know-how. Accordingly, this section shows how functional differentiation of the various integration agendas can allow progress to be made on specific issues that are seen as more technical, even amid ideological divergences and beyond the presidential summits. Regarding the autonomy of the organizations, it is argued that the organizations’ capacity for agency vis-à-vis the Member States also allows them to increase their margin for action. Beyond the delegation of competencies and authority, the ability to set agendas and mobilize resources more autonomously allowed several of these organizations to act more decisively. Regarding the leadership variable, it is argued that leadership, be it the president of a member country (for example holding the pro tempore presidency) or a strong general secretariat of the organization, can be decisive in bringing organizations out of paralysis (as in the case of CELAC) or in advancing in response to the crisis even amid disputes between the presidents of the member states, as shown in the case of SICA and PAHO. Accumulated knowledge (know-how) also proved to be critical, as is shown especially in the cases of SICA, CARICOM, and PAHO -in this case, the accumulated experience in health crisis management proved instrumental in preparing and facing the virus. Moreover, it is interesting that the awareness of the structural weakness of SICA and CARICOM member countries has led them to develop know-how and more capacities for fundraising and channeling external resources to deal with crises. The importance of accumulated know-how makes the dismantling of regional institutions such as the UNASUR Health Council (which had experience and contributed to the management of previous pandemics) even more worrisome.
In its third section, the article derives some more general lessons for Latin American regionalism from the responses of these regional organizations to Covid-19 (and the absence of particular actions in some cases). However, some caveats are also raised about the limitations of these lessons. Some theses are discussed, and some proposals are formulated to contribute to the debate on how to shield regionalism from the ideological divergences that come with political changes in Latin America. Particular emphasis is placed on the idea that a more technical, functionally differentiated, and segmented regionalism can better withstand the onslaught of ideological polarization in Latin America. The critical point of segmentation is the creation of separate organizational bodies to deal with strategic and regionally less controversial issues -either because they are considered more technical or there are fewer dogmatic positions than in other regional agendas. For example, a South American health organization or a South American center for disease control could be created. It is argued that such an organizational approach can better withstand the assault of growing regional ideological polarization, especially when compared to the risks of paralysis and crisis of “umbrella” organizations that cover a multiplicity of issues through numerous councils or other sub-units. Segmented organizations on not-so-political or technical issues, which are endowed with greater autonomy, could be much better protected from the spillover of political polarization and conflicts between presidents. It could also be easier for civil society actors to work with such sectoral, technically oriented organizations. A more technical approach to regional cooperation would also strengthen the role of development banks such as the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) or the Inter-American Development Bank as “orchestrators” of regional initiatives as it happened during the Covid-19 pandemic.
The article also warns that there is also a risk that lessons will not be learned, similar mistakes will be made again, and positive developments will be reversed. The essentially intergovernmental character of regional cooperation means that more technically oriented organs cannot be completely shielded from political cycles. Functional segmentation is not the solution to all problems of Latin American regionalism. There could always be a backlash against an overly independent and apolitical orientation of such technical organs, or they could become more politicized. Despite some positive examples of successful cooperation in combating the pandemic, many of the structural limitations of Latin American regionalism have not changed for the better.
