Acceso usuarios
Santiago, Chile
La dogmática constitucional mayoritaria y la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional han afirmado sostenidamente que la acción de inaplicabilidad implica un control concreto de constitucionalidad de las leyes. A juicio de esa dogmática y de la jurisprudencia, este control no examina la constitucionalidad del precepto legal, sino que controla si su aplicación en un caso específico produce efectos inconstitucionales.Sin embargo, ciertos vicios de constitucionalidad son originarios y afectan la constitucionalidad de la norma legal. En cuyo caso no serían controlables por esa vía. No obstante, sí se ha ejercido respecto de ellos el control posterior a través de la acción de inaplicabilidad.En tal sentido, la premisa que guía este trabajo es la siguiente: el proceso constituyente en curso abre un espacio para diferenciar dos tipos de exámenes en el ámbito de la acción de inaplicabilidad. Un control de los efectos inconstitucionales que un precepto legal, no afectado por un vicio de inconstitucionalidad, genera por su aplicación en una gestión judicial específica. Y otro, de un precepto legal que necesariamente producirá efectos inconstitucionales porque es inconstitucional. El primero conduce a un control concreto y el segundo a un control abstracto. Pero sobre todo es una oportunidad para separar la actual acción de inaplicabilidad en dos acciones, una de control concreto que resuelva los casos en que un precepto legal, aplicable en una gestión pendiente, produzca efectos inconstitucionales, de otra acción que implique un control abstracto de los vicios de inconstitucionalidad que afectan a una norma.
The majority constitutional dogmatic and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court have consistently affirmed that the inapplicability action implies a concrete control of the constitutionality of the laws. In the opinion of this dogmatic and jurisprudence, this control does not examine the constitutionality of the legal precept, but controls whether its application in a specific case produces unconstitutional effects.However, certain vices of constitutionality are original and affect the constitutionality of the legal norm. In which case, they would not be controllable in this way. However, subsequent control has been exercised with respect to them through the action of inapplicability.In this sense, the premise that guides this work is the following: the constitutional process in course opens a space to differentiate two types of exams in the field of inapplicability action. A control of the unconstitutional effects that a legal precept, not affected by a vice of unconstitutionality, generates by its application in a specific judicial management. And another, of a legal precept that will necessarily produce unconstitutional effects because it is unconstitutional. The first leads to concrete control and the second to abstract control. But above all, it is an opportunity to separate the current action of inapplicability into two actions, one of concrete control that resolves the cases in which a legal precept, applicable in a pending procedure, produces unconstitutional effects, and another action that implies an abstract control of the vices of unconstitutionality that affect a norm.
Summary:1. INTRODUCTION. 2. PREMISE, METHODOLOGY AND PLAN OF ANALYSIS. 3. THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE ACTION OF INAPPLICABILITY ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE. 4. THE QUESTIONING BY CERTAIN AUTHORS OF THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF THE ACTION OF INAPPLICABILITY. 5. THE VICES OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AND ABSTRACT CONTROL. 5.1 The problem. 5.2. Practices of the Constitutional Court practice, regarding the vices of unconstitutionality. 6. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPROVED TEXT.
