Acceso usuarios
Victor Portugal
In this article I attempt to deal with Husserl’s transcendental turn in connection with the reception by the Göttingen circle through three different aspects. My contribution aims to be chiefly historical, in order to provide a general picture of one of the most important events in the history of phenomenology, but also to enact possible systematic consequences related to the interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology after this event. First, I briefly recover the background within which Husserl erected with his Logische Untersuchungen, going over his development until the publication of his Ideen I, reconstructing the main points and features expounded in the latter that characterized transcendental phenomenology. Secondly, I put forward a general characterization of some of the main critiques raised by his students at the time, namely the concept of pure consciousness and world, as well as the performance of the phenomenological method. Thirdly, I attempt to expose, by means of Husserl’s later texts, some of his main responses to misunderstandings regarding his phenomenology.
