Acceso usuarios
Carlos Sanz Díaz 
, José Manuel Sáenz Rotko
En la última década, políticos, analistas y periodistas han reactivado el concepto de Guerra Fría (GF) para aplicarlo como categoría analítica a situaciones del presente. La invasión de Ucrania por Rusia en febrero de 2022 ha puesto radicalmente de actualidad el concepto de Nueva Guerra Fría (NGF) o Segunda Guerra Fría (SGF).
Nuestra investigación busca responder a tres interrogantes fundamentales: 1. ¿en qué medida el empleo de la analogía histórica de la GF es una herramienta útil para dotar de sentido a la realidad internacional actual en relación con las tensiones entre Rusia y los países occidentales?; 2. ¿de qué manera una determinada interpretación sobre el final de la GF proyecta su significado como marco interpretativo esgrimido por la Rusia de Vladímir Putin para justificar su política exterior, en particular en relación con Ucrania?; 3. ¿resulta pertinente la aplicación del concepto de NGF o SGF a la rivalidad entre China y Estados Unidos? El artículo se estructura en cuatro partes. El apartado 1 expone los fundamentos teóricos y metodológicos que enmarcan la investigación. En el apartado 2 se analiza la aplicación de la categoría de NGF o SGF a las relaciones actuales entre Rusia y los países occidentales, primordialmente EEUU y la OTAN. El epígrafe 3 examina la aportación de la historiografía académica a los debates sobre los hechos de 1989-1991, y en particular a la cuestión de las promesas hechas a la URSS, y después a Rusia, sobre la expansión de la OTAN, y su aportación al enmarcado de las relaciones internacionales actuales. El apartado 4 analiza en qué medida el concepto de GF y su reformulación como NGF o SGF arrojan claridad a la hora de conceptualizar la relación entre Estados Unidos y China. Por último, un apartado de conclusiones expone las aportaciones principales del estudio.
La base teórica la configura la teoría del framing o del encuadre de los procesos comunicativos (Goffman, 1974), aplicados al empleo de analogías históricas en relaciones internacionales. Consideramos el recurso a analogías históricas como una técnica particular de encuadre que atribuye una relación de semejanza entre acontecimientos, personajes o fenómenos del pasado y del presente para deducir patrones y generar redes de significados relevantes para la comprensión de fenómenos actuales, orientando la forma en que los concibe, organiza y relaciona la complejidad. El empleo de analogías históricas forma parte de la tradición de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales desde sus orígenes, y específicamente se ha considerado el recurso a la analogía histórica como una forma privilegiada en que la historia influencia el ejercicio del poder de los Estados (statecraft) en política exterior (Brands y Suri, 2015). El método histórico como herramienta analítica resulta adecuada y eficaz para identificar las analogías históricas postuladas y valorar críticamente su veracidad.
In the last decade, politicians, analysts and journalists have reactivated the concept of the Cold War (CW) to apply it as an analytical category to situations of the present. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has brutally brought the concept of the New Cold War (NCW) or Second Cold War (SCW) to the forefront. The application of concepts identifying events or stages of the historical past to situations of the present illustrates the opportunities and limits of these categories of historical analysis to International Relations.
Our analysis seeks to answer three main questions: 1. To what extent is the use of the historical analogy of the CW a useful tool to give meaning to the current international reality and in particular tensions between Russia and the West?; 2. In what ways is a given interpretation of the end of the CW projected as an interpretative framework by Vladimir Putin’s Russia to justify its foreign policy and particularly in relation to Ukraine? 3. Is the application of the concept of NCW relevant to the rivalry between China and the United States? The article is structured in four parts: Section one sets out the theoretical and methodological foundations that frame the research. Section two discusses the application of the category of NCW or SCW to current relations between Russia and Western countries such as the US, and also NATO. Given the centrality of the historical account of the end of the CW in Putin’s public discourse as a justification for Russia’s current foreign policy, section three examines the contribution of academic historiography to the debates on the events of 1989-1991, and in particular to the question of the promises made to the USSR, and later to Russia, on the expansion of NATO, and its contribution to the framing of current international relations. Section four discusses the extent to which the concept of CW and its reformulation as NCW or SCW provides clarity in conceptualizing the relations between the United States and China. Finally, a section of conclusions illustrates the main contributions of the article, and proposes future lines of research and debate around the object of study.
The theoretical basis of the analysis is configured by the theory of framing of communicative processes (Goffman, 1974), applied to the use of historical analogies in international relations. We consider the use of historical analogies as a particular framing technique that attributes a relationship of similarity between events, characters or phenomena of the past and present to deduce patterns and generate networks of meanings relevant to the understanding of current phenomena. The use of historical analogies has been part of the tradition of the discipline of International Relations since its origins, and specifically the use of historical analogy has been considered as a privileged way in which history influences statecraft in foreign policy (Brands and Suri, 2015). Constructivist approaches have drawn attention to the way in which the enunciation of metaphors, discourses and analogies shapes international politics and constitutes the world experienced by virtue of the performative function of language (Debrix, 2003).
Throughout the article it is shown how the use of historical categories shapes internationalist analysis about the present, projecting interpretative frameworks that guide and at the same time constrain the understanding of international complexity. As far as the current relations between Russia and the West is concerned, we can identify since 2005 a meticulous construction by the Kremlin of a narrative perfectly adjusted to Russian geopolitical interests, consisting of the reconstruction of territorial power and global influence lost between 1989 and 1991. A mid and long-term framing project is a posteriori envisaged, strategically planned, and progressively and effectively put into practice. This has the argument of a traditional Western aggressiveness towards Russia at its core, one which must be faced today, as in the times of the CW, to not succumb to it. By framing current Russian foreign policy in the logic and dynamics of the GF —which from a Soviet perspective had always been defensive— Putin sets the mental framework for his domestic stakeholders while justifying his foreign policy agenda that culminated —for the time being— with the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
That historical analysis is essential to adjust distorted historical references at the service of foreign policy interests to the factual reality is evident in light of the controversy over the alleged Western promises to not expand NATO to the East. The historiographical debate has helped to clarify without a doubt as false one of the central premises of Putin’s narrative to justify the use of force in Georgia and Ukraine since 2008, since no formal or informal agreements in this regard were explicitly or implicitly made either during the negotiating process for the reunification of Germany or in the years that followed.
In relation to a possible NCW between Beijing and Washington, the analysis highlights a number of analogies between the historical conflict and the current Sino-American relations. These include the fact that only these two can currently be considered superpowers, or that there is a potentially hot conflict around Taiwan, with a dynamic of deterrence and persuasion typical of the CW. In this context, there is a certain political rhetoric and orientation in the American academic sphere demanding, as George Kennan did in 1946, a determined containment of China at all levels. However, there are also a number of indicators that weaken the NCW as a valid interpretative category. The absence of military friction along with the possibility of achieving hegemony through economic factors make it less likely to fall into an arms race dynamic. At the same time, the very intense interconnection of the Chinese and American economies creates a de facto interdependence that, if separated through confrontation, would result in a great loss for both. Moreover, Chinese communism does not aspire to expand globally, like Soviet communism did, and its focus on economic growth should theoretically lead China to seek harmonious relations with the rest of the world. More than a NCW, the conceptualization of the West’s relations with China requires more complex interpretive models that take into account that China is, depending on the level of analysis, both partner, competitor and rival.
