El constituyente puede verse tentado a ser jurídicamente autista, al plagio normativo, a confundir sus papeles de legislador excepcional con los de legislador ordinario, a ser confuso, a mentir con promesas difícilmente realizables, a imponer autoritariamente su constitución y a creer que ella es perfecta. Tales tentaciones, si se las acepta, pueden conducir a una constitución conflictuada con el derecho internacional, o con cláusulas copiadas pero impracticables, ambiguas, falsas y defectuosas. Ello produce fenómenos de fracaso, frustración, rechazo colectivo y casi segura desconstitucionalización.
The constituent can be tempted to be legally autistic, to normative plagiarism, to confuse his roles of exceptional legislator with those of ordinary legislator, to be confused, to lie with promises that are difficult to fulfill, to impose his constitution authoritatively and to believe that it is perfect. Such temptations, if accepted, can lead a constitution to conflict with international law, or with copied but impracticable, ambiguous, false and defective clauses. This produces phenomena of failure, frustration, collective rejection and almost certain “deconstitutionalization”.