Acceso usuarios
Much of the political violence literature emphasizes the importance of coercive capacity in securing both local control and local support in times of conflict. But armed groups sometimes enjoy extensive support even in areas where the state has high penetrative capacity and high levels of control. To retain this support armed groups need to maintain a certain degree of local legitimacy. This paper examines the way in which the Provisional Irish Republican Army balanced coercion and legitimacy in its interactions with civilians in the Catholic urban neighbourhoods of Northern Ireland, the "urban statelets of Belfast and Derry" as one British civil servant referred to them in 1976. Drawing on memoirs by former IRA volunteers, on other published accounts of car hijackings and on state archives it argues that the need to maintain popular support, local legitimacy and an identification with the local community severely inhibited IRA actions, narrowing their strategic and tactical options, limiting their operational capacity and shaping their actions at the micro-level. It points to the delicacy of the balance between coercive power and legitimation in the securing of local control by armed insurgents.
