Este artculo analiza los cambios en el reclutamiento de candidatos al poder legislativo para mostrar cmo la creciente competencia electoral est afectando las relaciones de poder dentro del ea! el antiguo partido hegemnico de Mxico. La autora asume que las candidaturas a diputado federal constituyen beneficios que se distribuyen entre los grupos y sectores del PRI para asegurar su lealtad y fomentar la formacin de alianzas. En la poca en que no exista competencia electoral, los tres sectores del partido, as como los secretarios de Estado, se encontraban entre los grupos ms favorecidos. Una comparacin de los antecedentes de los diputados del PRI en 1985 y 1997 muestra cmo, ante el aumento de la competencia electoral, los gobernadores y la burocracia federal y estatal del PRI utilizaron la amenaza de la derrota en las votaciones para ganar ms espacio poltico dentro del partido.
This article investigates changes in legislative recruitment within the PRI to bring to light how rising levels of electoral competition are affecting the internal relations of power within the heretofore hegemonic party in Mexico. It assumes federal deputy candidacies to be benefits which were and are distributed to groups and sectors within the eie to ensure their continued loyalty and promote alliance formation. When elections were not competitive, the three sectors of the party, and the cabinet secretaries were among the most favored groups. By comparing the backgrounds of deputies in 1985 and 1997, the author is able to show that rising levels of competition, allowed governors and the national and state bureaucracies of the party to use the threat of defeat at the polls to win more political space within the PRI.