Acceso usuarios
Alberto Díaz Cayeros
Este artculo examina el federalismo fiscal mexicano desde el punto de vista de la formacinde coaliciones legislativas. El anlisis de las coaliciones mnimas ganadoras conectadas(CMGC) sugiere que, si bien la formacin de coaliciones ser difcil, dado el alto gradode disciplina partidaria en la legislatura, es posible una reforma del federalismo fiscal enMxico. Sin embargo, dicha reforma puede llevar a un sistema altamente redistributivo,que reforzara an ms el desequilibrio vertical del actual arreglo; o a una mayor devolucinde autoridad fiscal que beneficiara a los estados ricos, lo cual aumentara la desigualdadregional.Palabras cl
This paper explores Mexican fiscal federalism from the point of view of legislative coalitionbuilding. The analysis of connected minimal winning coalitions (CMWC) suggests thatalthough coalition formation will be difficult, given the high degree of party discipline inthe legislature, a reform of fiscal federalism in Mexico is possible. However, such reformcan lead either to a highly redistributive system, which would further reinforce the verticalimbalances of the current arrangement; or to a greater devolution of tax authority benefitingrich states, which would further enhance regional inequality.
