Evaluación de los límites de la democracia radical

• Autores: Jack Knight, James Johnson
• Localización: Gestión y política pública, ISSN-e 2448-9182, ISSN 1405-1079, Vol. 14, Nº 3, 2005, págs. 497-526
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Assessing the Boundaries of Radical Democracy
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    En este artículo, abordamos el tema de lo que se ha definido como democracia radical y evaluamos sus límites. En lo particular, quitamos el centro de atención del supuesto impacto “transformador” de las instituciones sobre los individuos y lo dirigimos a las maneras particulares en que las instituciones, tal como las conocemos, coordinan la interacción social, económica y política entre los individuos, tal como los encontramos. El caso de la democracia radical, según nuestra versión, deriva de la presunta prioridad que tiene la toma de decisiones democrática en el diseño de arreglos institucionales globales.

  • English

    In this article we analyze the radical democracy concept and evaluate its limits. In particular we shift attention from the purported “transformative” impact of institutions on individuals to the particular ways in which institutions as we know them coordinate social, economic and political interaction among individuals as we find them. The case for radical democracy, on our account, derives from the presumptive priority of democratic decisionmaking in the design of encompassing institutional arrangements.

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