Variabilidad intuicional y racionalismo modal naturalista: alcances y límites del escepticimo experimental

• Rafael Miranda-Rojas ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad Católica del Maule

     Universidad Católica del Maule

     Provincia de Talca, Chile

     
• Localización: Revista de filosofía, ISSN-e 0798-1171, Vol. 38, Nº. 99, 3, 2021, págs. 317-336
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5648443
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Intuitional variability and naturalist modal rationalism: scopes and limits of experimental skepticism
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    El rol de una intuición racional es objeto de un intenso debate actualmente.

    Particularmente, se discute qué rol epistémico cumple, si cumple alguno. Recientemente, Machery (2017) ha propuesto un escepticismo modal respecto a la validez de las intuiciones en el ámbito filosófico, restringiendo con esto los alcances de la disciplina filosófica en general. Así, la propuesta de la filosofía experimental negativa no solo descartaría la validez de las intuiciones en el ámbito filosófico, sino que a través de este debate cuestionaría la naturaleza de la filosofía, así como su objeto de estudio. Es por tanto una discusión metafilosófica. En este escrito propongo una respuesta anti escéptica al rol de las intuiciones racionales, a la vez que abordo los principales alcances del cuestionado método de casos. Concluyo que si bien una intuición no justifica ni evidencia alguna creencia o conocimiento, cumple un rol propedéutico relevante, el que permite sostener una posición racionalista naturalista empíricamente informada.

  • English

    Today, rational intuition is the subject of intense debate. Particularly, it is discussed what epistemic role it fulfills, if it fulfills some. Recently, Machery (2017) has proposed a modal skepticism regarding the validity of intuitions in the philosophical field, restricting with this moreover the scope of the philosophical discipline in general. The proposal of experimental philosophy would not only rules out the validity of intuitions in the philosophical field, but might through this debate put in question the very nature of philosophy, as well as its object of study. It is therefore a metaphilosophical discussion. In this paper I propose an anti-skeptical response to the role of rational intuitions, while at the same I discuss the scope of method of cases. I conclude that although an intuition does not justify or evidence any belief or knowledge, it fulfills a relevant propaedeutic role, which allows sustaining an rationalist naturalist position, empirically informed.

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