Las provisiones legales de la banca europea: transparencia, discrecionalidad y buen gobierno

• Felix J. López-Iturriaga ^[1] ; Jorge Gallud Cano ^[1] ; Óscar López de Foronda Pérez ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidad de Valladolid

     Universidad de Valladolid

     Valladolid, España

     
  2. [2] Universidad de Burgos

     Universidad de Burgos

     Burgos, España

     
• Localización: Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación. CEF, ISSN-e 2792-8306, ISSN 2695-6896, Nº 452, 2020, págs. 157-192
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • European banks’ legal provisions: disclosure, discretional behaviour and good corporate governance
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar la política de dotación de provisiones legales de la banca europea durante el periodo 2008-2017. Dichas provisiones constituyen una herramienta para mejorar la transparencia de la empresa, pero pueden obedecer también a motivaciones discrecionales. Utilizando una muestra de 92 bancos sistémicos de 18 países supervisados por el Mecanismo Único de Supervisión del Banco Central Europeo, nuestra investigación propone tres resultados principales. En primer lugar, encontramos una relación negativa entre la discrecionalidad directiva y las provisiones legales, lo que sugiere una renuencia por parte de los directivos al reconocimiento del riesgo. Un segundo resultado es el efecto moderador de la independencia del consejo de administración, que se erige en instrumento que favorece la dotación de las correspondientes provisiones legales cuando la discrecionalidad directiva así lo aconseja. En tercer lugar, nuestros resultados avalan la eficacia de un entorno institucional adecuado (en términos de calidad legal y protección de los inversores), que constituye una condición necesaria para que el consejo de administración desarrolle su tarea.

  • English

    The aim of this paper is to analyse European banks’ legal provisions during the period 2008- 2017. We consider these provisions as a disclosure tool that can improve the transparency of the company, but may also be driven by self-interest motivations. We use a sample of 92 systemic banks from 18 countries supervised by the Single Supervisory Mechanism of the European Central Bank. Three main results emerge from our research. First, we find a negative relationship between managerial discretional behaviour and legal provisions, suggesting that managers are reluctant to recogise risk. A second result is the moderating effect of the independence of the board of directors, which becomes an effective instrument for recognising risk through legal provisions. Third, our results support the effectiveness of an appropriate institutional environment (in terms of legal quality and investors protection), which is a necessary condition for the board of directors to carry out its task.

• Referencias bibliográficas
  • Acharya, V. V., Amihud, Y. y Litov, L. (2011). Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 102, 150-166.
  • Acharya, V. y Naqvi, H. (2012). The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle. Journal of Financial...
  • Adam, T. y Goyal, V. K. (2008). The investment opportunity set and its proxy variables. Journal of Financial Research, 31, 41-63.
  • Adams, R. B. (2017). The ABCs of empirical corporate (governance) research. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 25, 461-464.
  • Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E. y Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and...
  • Akbar, S., Kharabsheh, B., Poletti-Hughes, J. y Shah, S. Z. A. (2017). Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector....
  • Allini, A., Manes Rossi, F. y Hussainey, K. (2016). The board's role in risk disclosure: an exploratory study of Italian listed stateowned...
  • Anderson, R. C. y Fraser, D. R. (2000). Corporate control, bank risk taking, and the health of the banking industry. Journal of Banking &...
  • Arellano, M. (2003). Panel data econometrics. Oxford University Press.
  • Arellano, M. y Honore, B. (2001). Panel data models: some recent developments. En Elsevier, pp. 3229-3296.
  • Baselga-Pascual, L., Trujillo-Ponce, A. y Cardone-Riportella, C. (2015). Factors influencing bank risk in Europe: Evidence from the financial...
  • Boyd, J. H., Graham, S. L. y Hewitt, R. S. (1993). Bank holding company mergers with nonbank financial firms: Effects on the risk of failure....
  • Boyd, J. H., De Nicolò, G. y Jalal, A. M. (2006). Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence Prepared. International...
  • Carnevale, C. y Mazzuca, M. (2014). Sustainability report and bank valuation: evidence from European stock markets. Business Ethics: A European...
  • CNMV. (2006). Código Unificado de Buen Gobierno de las Sociedades Cotizadas. Madrid.
  • CNMV. (2013). Código Unificado de Buen Gobierno de las Sociedades Cotizadas. Madrid.
  • CNMV. (2015). Código de Buen Gobierno de las Sociedades Cotizadas. Madrid.
  • Cheng, E. C. M. y Courtenay, S. M. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting,...
  • Chen, X., Sun, Y. y Xu, X. (2016). Free cash flow, over-investment and corporate governance in China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 37, 81-103.
  • Chen, I. J., Lee, Y. Y. y Liu, Y. C. (2019). Bank liquidity, macroeconomic risk, and bank risk: Evidence from the Financial Services Modernization...
  • Demsetz, R. S. y Strahan, P. E. (1997). Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding Companies. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29,...
  • Ding, S., Knight, J. y Zhang, X. (2019). Does China overinvest? Evidence from a panel of Chinese firms. The European Journal of Finance, 25,...
  • Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. y Shleifer, A. (2008). The law and economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics,...
  • Erkens, D. H., Hung, M. y Matos, P. (2012). Corporate governance in the 2007-2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial Institutions worldwide....
  • Farag, H. y Mallin, C. (2017). Board diversity and financial fragility: Evidence from European banks. International Review of Financial Analysis,...
  • Guo, L., Jalal, A. y Khaksari, S. (2015). Bank executive compensation structure, risk taking and the financial crisis. Review of Quantitative...
  • Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L. y William, C. (1998). Multivariate data analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
  • Huafang, X. y Jianguo, Y. (2007). Ownership structure, board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from listed companies...
  • Huse, M., Hoskisson, R. E., Zattoni, A. y Viganò, R. (2011). New perspectives on board research: changing the research agenda. Journal of...
  • International Financial Reporting Standards. (1998). IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets.
  • Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76, 323-329.
  • Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. y Mastruzzi, M. (2011). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. Hague Journal on the...
  • Kirkpatrick, G. (2009). The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis. Financial Market Trends 2009/1.
  • Laeven, L. (2013). Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? Annual Review of Financial Economics, 5, 63-92.
  • Lei, A. C. H. y Deng, J. (2014). Do Multiple Directorships Increase Firm Value? Evidence from Independent Directors in Hong Kong. Journal...
  • Lepetit, L., Nys, E., Rous, P. y Tarazi, A. (2008). Bank income structure and risk: An empirical analysis of European banks. Journal of Banking...
  • Levine, R. (1998). The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 30, 596-613.
  • Li, K., Griffin, D., Yue, H. y Zhao, L. (2013). How does culture influence corporate risk-taking? Journal of Corporate Finance, 23, 1-22.
  • Palvia, A., Vähämaa, E. y Vähämaa, S. (2015). Are female CEOs and Chairwomen more conservative and risk averse? Evidence from the banking...
  • Peni, E. y Vähämaa, S. (2012). Did Good Corporate Governance Improve Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis? Journal of Financial Services...
  • Richardson, S. (2006). Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 11, 159-189.
  • Schnabl, G. y Hoffmann, A. (2008). Monetary Policy, Vagabonding Liquidity and Bursting Bubbles in New and Emerging Markets: An Overinvestment...
  • Sihombing, J. y Pangaribuan, H. (2017). A study of corporate governance structure, disclosure and information asymmetry in Indonesia banking...
  • Singh, D. y Delios, A. (2017). Corporate governance, board networks and growth in domestic and international markets: Evidence from India....
  • Uhde, D. A., Klarner, P. y Tuschke, A. (2017). Board monitoring of the chief financial officer: A review and research agenda. Corporate Governance:...
  • Vazquez, F. y Federico, P. (2015). Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance,...
  • Ying, Q., Danglun, L. y Wu, L. (2013). Bank credit lines and overinvestment: evidence from China. The International Journal of Business and...
  • Chiang, H. T. y He, L. J. (2010). Board supervision capability and information transparency. Corporate Governance: An International Review,...