Acceso usuarios
Miguel Angel Benedicto Solsona 
, María José Molina García
Las cambiantes circunstancias geopolíticas globales (con una Rusia revisionista, una China en ascenso y más asertiva, unos Estados Unidos en retirada y con valores cada vez más distintos a los europeos, la inestabilidad procedente del este y del Mediterráneo sur, la consumación del Brexit...), han obligado a la Unión Europea, tras la aprobación de su Estrategia Global sobre Política Exterior y de Seguridad, a desarrollar una serie de herramientas políticas e institucionales en favor de su autonomía estratégica en el ámbito de la seguridad y defensa (los Planes de Acción, la cooperación estructurada permanente, la Iniciativa Europea de Intervención...). Todo ello de acuerdo con el nivel de ambición que fijen los estados miembros, que oscila desde la protección de su vecindad a convertirse en proveedor universal de seguridad global, véase al respecto el liderazgo francoalemán en defensa. Basándonos en este contexto que se reseña en líneas precedentes, en el que concurren diversas variables y actores, y desde la perspectiva que ofrece la ciencia de las Relaciones Internacionales, se articula nuestro objeto de estudio, que aspira a constatar si los cambios de un orden mundial basado en reglas a otro trufado de hard power requieren de un paso hacia delante de la Unión Europea con una cultura estratégica común, analizada desde un enfoque constructivista, junto con un mayor liderazgo y voluntad política. Esto es, en el entorno internacional actual ¿garantizar la seguridad y defensa de Europa de manera autónoma se erige en una necesidad para la Unión Europea? Consecuentemente, ¿se reduciría el apoyo OTAN? De momento, la Unión necesita a la OTAN, pero no puede descuidar sus propias capacidades. Para articular nuestra propuesta de investigación nos situamos en uno de los niveles de análisis propio de las Relaciones Internacionales, en el plano de la microinternacionalidad, que se identificaría con el de la política exterior de la Unión Europea y los desafíos a los que se enfrenta, y en un marco temporal concreto que responde a la línea de acción que viene desarrollándose desde la adopción de la Estrategia Global en 2016 hasta el momento presente con una Unión que apuesta por una Europa “geopolítica”. Desde una función explicativa, respaldada por la consulta de fuentes actuales (primarias y derivadas), se estructura el análisis del siguiente modo: (1) se parte de examinar el incierto y complejo escenario internacional y europeo, del que emergen desafíos globales y regionales; (2) para posteriormente definir qué se entiende por autonomía estratégica bajo el contexto de aquella Estrategia y delimitar cuáles son sus variables de análisis; (3) así como estudiar, desde una perspectiva institucionalista, los diferentes instrumentos políticos e institucionales que la Unión va adoptando y evaluar su idoneidad o no para impulsar la autonomía estratégica europea; (4) y cumpliendo con una función práctica, nuestro estudio se concluye valorando si el proceso de evolución de la Unión en este ámbito está cumpliendo o no con sus capacidades y condicionamientos, y discerniendo sobre cómo se debe afrontar la etapa venidera.
The changing global geopolitical circumstances (with a revisionist Russia, a rising and more assertive China, a withdrawing United States with values increasingly different from those of Europe, the instability coming from the East and the Southern Mediterranean, the consummation of Brexit...) are the contextual backdrop of the European Union, and following the adoption of its Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy it has developed a series of political and institutional tools to support its strategic autonomy in the field of security and defence (Action Plans, EU-NATO cooperation, permanent structured cooperation, the European Initiative for Intervention...). To these instruments can be added others provided for in the Lisbon Treaty (2009), such as the solidarity and mutual assistance clauses, the latter invoked after the Daesh attack in Paris in November 2015, as a defensive alliance to guarantee security in European countries. All this is in line with the level of ambition set by the Member States, which ranges from protecting their neighbourhood to becoming a universal provider of global security -in this respect one notes the Franco-German leadership in defence. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron approved a Declaration in June 2018 at the Château de Meseberg that included majority voting in foreign policy, security and defence matters in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of decision-making. In addition, it advocated the European Intervention Initiative and new formats such as a European Security Council, as well as strengthening European coordination within the United Nations and the development of a European fighter jet.
Based on this context that is outlined in previous lines, in which diverse variables and actors concur and from the perspective offered by the science of international relations, our object of study is articulated that aspires to verify if the changes from a world order based on rules to another truffle of hard power, require a step forward for the European Union with a common strategic culture, analysed from a constructivist approach (Meyer, 2007 y 2004), along with greater leadership and political will. In other words, in the current international context, is ensuring the security and defence of Europe autonomously a necessity for the European Union? Consequently, would NATO support be reduced? At the moment, the Union needs NATO, but it cannot neglect its own capabilities.
In order to articulate our research proposal, we place ourselves in one of the levels of analysis specific to international relations, on the plane of micro-internationality (Calduch, 1991, p. 13), which would be identified with that of the European Union’s foreign policy and the challenges it faces. And also in a temporal framework that responds to the line of action that has been developed since the adoption of the Global Strategy in 2016 until the present moment with a Union that is committed to a “geopolitical” Europe.
From an explanatory perspective, supported by consultation of current sources (primary and derived), the analysis is structured as follows: 1) The starting point is to examine the complex and uncertain international and European scenario, from which global and regional challenges emerge, with the risk of further conflicts. We explain this context from the instability coming from the East, the Balkans and the Southern Mediterranean, as well as the references to the Trump Administration and the process commonly known as Brexit. 2) To subsequently define what is meant by strategic autonomy in the context of that European Global Strategy and to delimit the variables of analysis. This autonomy has its immediate antecedent in the Saint Malo Agreement (1998). In that agreement, both the United Kingdom and France agreed that the EU should have the capacity for “autonomous action”, supported by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a preparation to do so. This is with the aim of responding to international crises, and under French-British sponsorship the 1999 Cologne European Council introduced “autonomy of action” with the purpose of acting in international crises included in the Treaties, either when NATO does not do so, as an independent actor, or together with the Atlantic Alliance. 3) The foregoing considerations are complemented and contextualised by the institutionalist approach (Smith, 2004) that provides the study with the different political and institutional instruments that the Union is adopting in the face of the need to promote the generation of civilian and military capabilities, as well as to assess their suitability or otherwise for promoting European strategic autonomy. All of this is aimed at strengthening European unity and giving coherence to external action within the framework of one of its founding pillars, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), launched at the Cologne Council in 1999 and renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Lisbon Treaty, which called for the adoption of measures to increase EU-NATO cooperation. 4) Finally, fulfilling a practical function, the conclusion is to assess whether or not the Union’s evolutionary process in this field is fulfilling its capacities and conditions, and to discern how the next stage should be approached. In this regard, we must assimilate those facts that will impact on the course and pace of the integration process and, therefore, on this desire for strategic autonomy, we refer to the departure of the United Kingdom (Brexit), the economic difficulties of certain European countries of the South in balancing their economic balance and the consequent reaction of the creditor countries of the North, the different perception of the threats and risks of the countries of the North in the face of Russian pressure or those of the South that have to deal with immigration pressure, the expansion of jihadist terrorism or the social and economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. For its part, the European Council, held in June 2018, ratified the will of the Member States to continue taking decisive steps to boost European defence, increase strategic autonomy and complement and strengthen NATO activities
