Milán, Italia
1. La dignità come valore di ogni uomo. - 2. La dignità umana come principio giuridico nelle principali fonto internazionali del secondo novecento. - 2.1. Nello specifico, la dignità umana come istanza di tutela della persona vulnerabile. - 3. La dignità umana nelle costituzioni tedesca e italiana: inviolabilità e relazionalità, in particolare rispetto al lavoro e alla salute. - 4. La dignità quale fondamento in senso universale-egualitario della soggettività giuridica e valore che preserva 'l' humanitas' di ciascuno e di tutti negli stati di bisogno o subordinazione. - 5. La dignità umana e il rischio della soggettivizzazione dei valori costituzionali.
The seventieth anniversary of the German constitution, with the famous art. 1 which proclaims the inviolability of human dignity, constitutes an opportunity to reflect on the meaning and implications of the value of dignity in the constitutional systems of the post-Auschwitz period in the light of the most relevant international conventions. The essay emphasizes that dignity, in addition to providing the basis for the universalization for legal subjectivity, plays a special role in protecting the person in situations of need or disparity where the value of dignity find a relational and coherent specification which the principle of solidarity. Particular attention is also paid to the controversial relationship between dignity and and self-determination, highlighting the need to distinguish these two values from the tendency to reduce dignity to self-determination. Dignity and self-determination should not in fact be thought of as antagonistic values since dignity is the foundation of the person's autonomy and therefore the source of its promotion as a value. There is in fact the risk of reversing the relationship between the two values and allowing the value of dignity to be absorved in that of self-determination with the consequence of regressing to a discriminatory conception of the dignity and substantially dismissing it of meaning.