Acceso usuarios
Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Maximilian Kerk
The most common pecuniary sanction, i.e. fxed-fnes, places an emphasis on the severity of the crime. This fne has the problem of being either too high for poorer ofenders to pay or too low for the richer ofenders to be deterred. Day-fnes, on the other hand, systematically account for the fnancial situation of the ofender as well as for the severity of his ofense. Consequently, it imposes equivalent burden of punishment on ofenders who committed similar crimes, regardless of their wealth. However, a problem of asymmetric information is raised. Accurate fnancial information is essential for the efciency of day-fnes, yet its collection is costly. Day-fnes receive increasing attention from policy-makers around the world. Nonetheless, it is under-researched in the law and economics literature. Therefore, this article is the frst to formally analyze the problem of asymmetric information in the context of day-fnes and to develop an optimal secondary enforcement system that would incentivize criminals to provide accurate information regarding their wealth.
