Dividend payout policy, family control, and institutional investors in an emerging country: The case of Mexico

• Humberto Valencia Herrera ^[1] ; Felipe Javier Ruiz Rivera ^[1]
  1. [1] Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey

     Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey

     México

     
• Localización: Contaduría y administración, ISSN 0186-1042, ISSN-e 2448-8410, Vol. 64, Nº. 4, 2019
• Idioma: inglés
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Política de pago de dividendos, control familiar e inversionistas institucionales en un país emergente: el caso de México
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    La razón de pago de dividendos y su volatilidad en las empresas que cotizan en la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores desde el segundo trimestre de 2009 hasta el primer trimestre de 2013 se relacionan con aspectos de gobierno corporativo. Un modelo de ecuaciones estructurales encontró que los inversionistas cionales evitan las empresas con una alta intervención familiar y prefieren el riesgo de mercado a pesar de la mayor volatilidad en el pago de dividendos. Del mismo modo, la volatilidad del pago de dividendos y el riesgo de mercado están positivamente relacionados. Además, el pago de dividendos es menor en empresas con alta intervención familiar en la gestión. Las empresas con un fuerte control familiar suavizan sus pagos de dividendos y tienen un número menor de inversores institucionales

  • English

    The dividend payout ratio and its volatility in firms listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange from the second quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2013 relate to corporate governance aspects. A structural equations model found that institutional investors avoid firms with high family intervention and prefer market risk despite greater volatility in dividend payouts. Similarly, the dividend payout volatility and market risk are positively related. Moreover, dividend payout is smaller in firms with high family intervention in management. Companies with a strong family control smooth their dividend payout and have a smaller number of institutional investors

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