Acceso usuarios
Honorine Awounou N Dri, Emmanuelle Dubocage
This article analyses the effect of the commonly used corporate governance practices in venture capital financing. More precisely, it studies how staged investment and syndication may impact the IPO performance (underpricing) of venture backed firms when going public. This empirical research relies on a unique dataset of 267 venture backed firms that went public on Euronext-Paris and Alternext between 1997 and 2013. The results show a lower underpricing for syndicated private equity-backed firms. In other words, the syndication of venture capital firms does impact the underpricing level at the IPO, as its size increases. This corporate governance mechanism minimizes the related-information asymmetry and agency costs of the IPO process. However, staged investment appears to have no significant effect.
Cet article analyse l’impact de l’investissement graduel et de la syndication sur le niveau de sous-évaluation des entreprises financées par le capital-investissement lors de leur entrée en Bourse. L’analyse empirique exploite des données relatives à 260 entreprises introduites en Bourse sur Euronext-Paris et Alternext entre 1997 et 2013. La pratique de la syndication constitue un mécanisme de gouvernance efficace d’amélioration de la performance de l’introduction en Bourse en réduisant les coûts d’agence et l’asymétrie d’information entre les parties prenantes de cette opération.
