Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes and Consequences

• Shane Martin ^[1] ; Tim A. Mickler ^[2]
  1. [1] University of Essex

     University of Essex

     Colchester District, Reino Unido

     
  2. [2] Leiden University

     Leiden University

     Países Bajos

     
• Localización: Parliamentary affairs: A journal of representative politics, ISSN 0031-2290, Vol. 72, Nº 1, 2019, págs. 77-98
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • Conventional wisdom suggests that a strong legislature is built on a strong internal committee system, both in terms of committee powers and the willingness of members to engage in committee work. Committee assignments are the behavioural manifestation of legislative organisation. Despite this, much remains unknown about how committee assignments happen and with what causes and consequences. Our focus in this article is on providing the context for, and introducing new research on, what we call the political economy of committee assignments—which members get selected to sit on which committees, why and with what consequences.