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The precautionary principle, though not defined in the Community Treaties, has been the subject of numerous attempts at doctrinal systematisation. These efforts have, for the most part, dealt with organising how to adopt measures banning products or methods of production. Associated with this rigorous approach to the precautionary principle are questions on moratoriums and reversal of the burden of proof. Following this logic, one must understand that the precautionary principle obliges the initiator of a project (or the producer of foodstuffs) to prove the innocuousness of its product before putting it on the market. However, this concept of the precautionary principle, while held by the larger part of doctrinal opinion, is not shared by the Community courts. These have largely developed Community law on this point with a progressive corpus of decisions that give an increasingly specific definition of the concept. This attempt at definition leads to a rational presentation of the precautionary principle as a means of dealing with scientific uncertainty and not as a way of rejecting science. The aim of this article is to show that the conception held by Community courts, while apparently less protective of human health than the doctrinal conception, has the advantage of being effective; that is to say capable of practical application, while the more rigorous interpretation leads only to a protective Utopian dead‐end, which its defenders find themselves incapable of progressing beyond.
