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Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of Justice determined the competence of the European Community and the Member States to conclude and implement WTO Agreements. Whilst the European Community enjoys exclusive competence to implement the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, it shares joint competence with the Member States in respect of the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. However, the Court’s recognition of a division of competences between the Community and the Member States in WTO agreements has given rise to many fears that such a division would greatly complicate Community and Member State participation in WTO Agreements, would create many problems for them in doing so and, as a result, would greatly impede their successful participation in the WTO. Given the benefit of a number of years’ experience in the WTO, this paper focuses on the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO and addresses the extent to which the division of competences between the Community and the Member States has affected their participation in the DSU. Primarily, it aims to examine the extent to which the provisions of the DSU affect Community and Member State participation in dispute settlement within the WTO. It then analyses the duty of co‐operation imposed on the Community and on Member States by the Court of Justice in Opinion 1/94 in the implementation of the WTO Agreements and the degree to which this duty influences their pursuit of dispute settlement. Finally, the paper examines the manner in which Community and Member State dispute settlement proceedings have evolved in practice, the extent to which the division of powers has penetrated dispute settlement proceedings and the manner in which the Community, the Member States and other WTO members have addressed it. In essence, the paper attempts both to highlight some of the more obvious consequences and effects that the internal division of powers between the Community and the Member States has for their participation in the DSU and to suggest some ways in which these consequences may be manipulated for their mutual and successful settlement of disputes.
