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Resumen:El art. 155 de la Constitución regula la coerción federal (federal coercion) con un texto inspirado en el art. 37 de la Ley Fundamental de Bonn, si bien presenta alguna importante diferencia, particularmente por la distinta configuración electoral del Senado y el Bundesrat. Su redacción es un ejemplo característico de la ambigüedad propia de los preceptos constitucionales; y su interpretación padece de que carece de desarrollo legislativo y precedentes históricos. Con su Resolución de 27 de octubre de 2017, el Senado ha aplicado por vez primera el art. 155 por entender que la Generalitat había incurrido en desobediencia a la Constitución. La autorización al Gobierno central conllevó el cese del Gobierno de Cataluña y la posterior disolución del Parlamento autonómico. Dos han sido los recursos de inconstitucionalidad instados, respectivamente, por el grupo parlamentario de Unidos-Podemos y por la Diputación Permanente del Parlamento de Cataluña. En este trabajo se aborda su análisis jurídico y se arriesga el vaticinio de Sentencia que habrá de dictar el Tribunal Constitucional.
Summary:1. Introduction: A highly political, ambiguous and vague rule; 2. Section 155 and regional tenseness. Examples of Comparative Law; 3. The unavoidable reference to the federal coercion in Germany. Section 155 and its comparison with section 37 of the Fundamental Law of Bonn; 4. The STGC of 5th of March, 1936; 5. The state coercion of section 155; 6. The former formal procedures to the state coercion of section 155; 7. The supposed facts in which section 155 is applicable; 8. The procedure of the state coercion; 9. The measures covered by section 155; 10. The exceptional political and legal application of section 155; 11. The injuction of the Spanish Government and the Order of the Spanish Senate of 27th of October, 2017; 12. The application of the state coercion of section 155 in Catalonia; 13. The procedural question of the judicial review of the Order of the Senate; 14. The motion filed by the political party UNIDOS-PODEMOS claiming that the application of section 155 is against the Spanish Constitution; 15. The Opinion 14/2017 of the Catalan Consell de Garanties Estatutarias. The motion filed by the Catalan Parliament for judicial review against the Order of the Spanish Senate; 16. The material question: Does the bloque de constitucionalidad entails a limit before section 155?Abstract:Section 155 of the Spanish Constitution regulates federal coercion by means of a text inspired in section 37 of the Fundamental Law of Bonn, although the former presents some important differences, especially due to the different electoral configuration of the Spanish Senate and the Bundesrat. The wording of section 155 is a good example of the characteristic ambiguity of constitutional texts. Its interpretation suffers from a lack of legislative development and former precedents. By means of the Order of 27th of October, 2017, the Spanish Senate has applied for the first time section 155, understanding that the Catalan Generalitat had violated the Constitution. The authorization given to the Spanish Government entailed the dismissal of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia and the dissolution of the Autonomous Parliament. Two motions have been filed,one by the parliamentary group Unidos-Podemos, and another by the DiputaciónPermanente of the Parliament of Catalonia. This paper tackles the legal analysis of section 155, and risks predicting the future ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court.
