Acceso usuarios
Dildar Hussain, Josef Windsperger
This study develops a property rights explanation of the multi-unit (MU) ownership strategy of the franchise firm. According to the property rights theory, the allocation of residual rights of control (decision and ownership rights) in franchise firms depends on the contractibility of system-specific and local market assets (LMA). We develop and test the following hypotheses: Multi-unit franchising (MUF) is positively related to the franchisor’s intangible system-specific assets and negatively to the franchisee’s intangible LMA. In addition, we argue that impact of financial assets on the tendency toward MUF depends on the contractibility of LMA. Empirical results from the German franchise sector provide partial support of the hypotheses. Compared to the agency theory, which focuses on (complete) incentive contracts that specify residual income rights between the franchisor and franchisee, property rights theory focuses on incomplete contracts that allocate residual control rights between the franchisor and network partners. Furthermore, compared to the resource scarcity theory, property rights theory explains the impact of contractibility of resources/assets on the ownership strategy of the franchise firm.This study develops a property rights explanation of the multi-unit (MU) ownership strategy of the franchise firm. According to the property rights theory, the allocation of residual rights of control (decision and ownership rights) in franchise firms depends on the contractibility of system-specific and local market assets (LMA). We develop and test the following hypotheses: Multi-unit franchising (MUF) is positively related to the franchisor’s intangible system-specific assets and negatively to the franchisee’s intangible LMA. In addition, we argue that impact of financial assets on the tendency toward MUF depends on the contractibility of LMA. Empirical results from the German franchise sector provide partial support of the hypotheses. Compared to the agency theory, which focuses on (complete) incentive contracts that specify residual income rights between the franchisor and franchisee, property rights theory focuses on incomplete contracts that allocate residual control rights between the franchisor and network partners. Furthermore, compared to the resource scarcity theory, property rights theory explains the impact of contractibility of resources/assets on the ownership strategy of the franchise firm.
