La aplicación de la “paradoja escéptica” al derecho

• Autores: Martín Oliveira
• Localización: Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía, ISSN-e 0120-0062, Vol. 67, Nº. 167, 2018, págs. 103-126
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.15446/ideasyvalores.v67n167.58669
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The Application of the “Skeptical Paradox” to Law
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    Se cuestionan las dos conclusiones imputadas a la aplicación de la “paradoja escéptica de Wittgenstein” al derecho, tal como es desarrollada por S. Kripke. A saber, o bien la paradoja se aplica a la práctica del derecho y esta es indeterminada e imposible, o bien aquella es completamente irrelevante para la práctica del derecho y la reflexión filosófica sobre este. Se sugiere que la filosofía del derecho puede aceptar la relevancia de esta paradoja y obtener nuevos elementos a partir de ella.

  • English

    The article questions the two conclusions attributed to the application of “Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox” to law, as developed by S. Kripke: that is, either the paradox is applied to the practice of law and it is indeterminate or impossible, or the paradox is completely irrelevant for the practice of law and for philosophical reflection in that respect. The paper suggests that philosophy of right can accept the relevance of the paradox and draw new elements from it.

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