¿Está la economía del comportamiento condenada a desaparecer?: Lo ordinario frente a lo extraordinario

• Autores: David K. Levine
• Localización: El trimestre económico, ISSN-e 2448-718X, ISSN 0041-3011, Nº. 307, 2010, págs. 509-531
• Idioma: español
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
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