Autoengaño y voluntarismo doxástico: Self–deception and doxastic voluntarism

• Autores: Gustavo Fernández Acevedo
• Localización: Estudios de Filosofía, ISSN-e 2256-358X, ISSN 0121-3628, Nº. 57, 2018, págs. 139-160
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.17533/udea.ef.n57a07
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    La doctrina conocida como “voluntarismo doxástico”, esto es, la idea según la cual podemos adoptar libremente nuestras creencias, ha sido considerada insostenible por la mayoría de los filósofos. Ahora bien, cabe distinguir dos versiones de esta doctrina. El voluntarismo doxástico directo, que coincide con la descripción precedente, y el voluntarismo doxástico indirecto, que sostiene la tesis más moderada según la cual sería posible inducir en nosotros mismos determinadas creencias de manera indirecta por medio de la modificación planificada de nuestras conductas. Bernard Williams, quien ha presentado influyentes argumentos en contra del voluntarismo doxástico directo, ha admitido que su variante indirecta es posible, pero sólo por medio del autoengaño. En este artículo se examinan distintas concepciones contemporáneas respecto del autoengaño y se concluye que bajo ninguna de las caracterizaciones presentadas este fenómeno puede constituir un medio eficiente para la inducción voluntaria indirecta de creencias.

  • English

    The doctrine known as “doxastic voluntarism”, that is, the idea according to which we can freely adopt our beliefs, has been considered as untenable by most philosophers. Moreover, it is possible to distinguish two versions of this doctrine. The direct doxastic voluntarism corresponding to the latter description; and the indirect doxastic voluntarism, that sustains a more moderate thesis according to which it would be possible to induce certain beliefs in ourselves in an indirect way through the planned modification of our conducts. Bernard Williams, who has presented influential arguments against the direct doxastic voluntarism, has admitted that its indirect variation is possible, but only via self–deception. In this article, different contemporary conceptions of self-deseption are examined, to conclude that under any of these can this phenomenon constitute an efficient means for the indirect voluntary induction of beliefs.

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