The independence of international courts – making reputation work?

• Stefan Voigt ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Hamburg

     University of Hamburg

     Hamburg, Freie und Hansestadt, Alemania

     
• Localización: Maastricht journal of European and comparative law, ISSN 1023-263X, Vol. 24, Nº. 4, 2017 (Ejemplar dedicado a: The independence of the international judiciary: Concept, methods, and current challenges), págs. 511-530
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1177/1023263x17723818
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• Resumen

  • Posner and Yoo challenge the conventional wisdom that independent courts are desirable at the international level. Based on the finding that factually independent courts on the nation state level have a number of positive effects, I ask whether factually independent courts at the international level also have positive effects. I argue that the main product supplied by international courts is information and that reliable information about the past behaviour of parties to a treaty is a necessary condition for the reputation mechanism to work internationally. I further argue that the independence of international judges is a necessary condition for the courts to produce high quality information.