Acceso usuarios
Argentina
Mi libro Encrucijadas Morales recientemente fue reseñado por una colega en una revista filosófica española. Como parte de la descripción del contenido del trabajo, se recuerdan allí algunas de las críticas realizadas al libro por el prologuista, el Profesor mexicano René González de la Vega. Estas críticas son las tres siguientes: Que mi texto manifiesta una forma problemática de anti-teoría moral; que expongo una forma censurable de escepticismo moral y, por último, que planteo una tensión no resuelta entre el requisito de imparcialidad invocado por los filósofos morales y políticos para justificar normas, por un lado, y el llamado residuo moral, por el otro.
Buscando que el presente trabajo tenga la suficiente autonomía para ser comprendido por un público más amplio que el involucrado directamente en este debate, discuto y contesto estos tres comentarios críticos de mi colega.
My book Moral Crossroads was recently reviewed by a colleague in a spanish philosophical journal dubbed as Under word. As part of the description of my book, she remembers the following question: that there are some criticisms of the book by the prologue made by the mexican philosopher René González de la Vega. The commentaries raised by René González de la Vega are the following three: That my text expresses a problematic form of moral anti-theory; I present a reprehensible form of moral skepticism and, finally, I raise an unresolved tension between the requirement of impartiality raised by the moral and political philosophers to justify rules on the one hand, and the so-called moral residue on the other. Looking for the present My book Moral Crossroads was recently reviewed by a colleague in a spanish philosophical journal dubbed as Under word. As part of the description of my book, she remembers the following question: that there are some criticisms of the book by the prologue made by the mexican philosopher René González de la Vega. The commentaries raised by René González de la Vega are the following three: That my text expresses a problematic form of moral anti-theory; I present a reprehensible form of moral skepticism and, finally, I raise an unresolved tension between the requirement of impartiality raised by the moral and political philosophers to justify rules on the one hand, and the so-called moral residue on the other. Looking for the present work has sufficient autonomy to be understood by those not directly involved in this debate, I attempt to discuss and answer these three critical comments of my colleague
