Acceso usuarios
Tom Froese
El computacionalismo aspira a ofrecer una teoría unificadora de la vida y la mente. Fracasa en esta tarea debido a que carece de las herramientas conceptuales para abordar el problema del significado. Argumento que una postura significativa es enactuada por un individuo con el potencial intrínseco a toda existencia biológica: la muerte. Para este individuo la vida importa a fin de adaptarse activamente, en lugar de desintegrarse pasivamente. Introduciré dos cosmovisiones antiguas y extranjeras que asignan a la muerte un rol constitutivo. Posteriormente, trazaré la emergencia de una concepción similar de mortalidad, derivada desde la era cibernética al desarrollo actual enfoque enactivo de la ciencia cognitiva. Finalmente, se analiza por qué el computacionalismo ortodoxo ha fracasado en atisbar de esta manera constitutiva el papel de la mortalidad.
Computationalism aspires to provide a comprehensivetheory of life and mind. It fails in this task becauseit lacks the conceptual tools to address the problemof meaning. I argue that a meaningful perspectiveis enacted by an individual with a potential that isintrinsic to biological existence: death. Life matters tosuch an individual because it must constantly createthe conditions of its own existence. For that individualto actively adapt, rather than to passively disintegrate,expresses a value inherent in its way of life, which is theultimate source of more refined forms of normativity.This response to the problem of meaning will notsatisfy those searching for a functionalist or logicalsolution, but on this view such a solution will not beforthcoming. As an intuition pump for this alternativeperspective I introduce two ancient foreign worldviewsthat assign a constitutive role to death. Then I tracethe emergence of a similar conception of mortalityfrom the cybernetics era to the ongoing developmentof enactive cognitive science. Finally, I analyze whyorthodox computationalism has failed to grasp therole of mortality in this constitutive way.
