El poder constituyente en la tradición constitucional americana: El legado problemático de los escritos federalistas

• Autores: Gabriel L. Negretto
• Localización: Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN-e 0718-3437, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 43, Nº. 3, 2016, págs. 787-812
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.4067/S0718-34372016000300002
• Títulos paralelos:
  • THE CONSTITUENT POWER IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION: THE PROBLEMATIC LEGACY OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    Los escritos federalistas propusieron un modelo de gobierno en el que la participación de los ciudadanos no es necesaria ni conveniente para introducir cambios a la Constitución. Los legisladores y los jueces serían los responsables de adaptarla a contextos cambiantes. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de involucrar a los ciudadanos en una reforma extralegal del sistema político permaneció siempre latente en el principio de soberanía popular que los federalistas utilizaron para justificar la legitimidad de la Constitución de Filadelfia. Esta situación nunca se presentó en la experiencia constitucional americana a nivel federal pero ha sido frecuente en democracias que siguen el legado de los federalistas norteamericanos y enfrentan demandas de reforma institucional profunda. En este escenario, que prima hoy en varios países de América Latina, se torna imprescindible repensar un sistema de revisión constitucional que no brinda a los ciudadanos canales de participación para alterar o sustituir la Constitución de forma pacífica y legal.

  • English

    The Federalist Papers proposed a model of government in which the participation of citizens is either unnecessary or inconvenient to make constitutional revisions. Legislators and judges would be responsible for adapting the constitution to changing environments. However, the possibility of involving citizens in an extra-legal reform of the political system remained always latent in the principle of popular sovereignty that the Federalists used to justify the legitimacy of the Philadelphia constitution. This situation never materialized in the American constitutional experience at the federal level but has been frequent in democracies that follow the legacy of the Federalists and face demands of radical institutional reform. In this scenario, which prevails today in several Latin American countries, it is imperative to rethink a system of constitutional revisions that deprives citizens of channels of participation to alter or replace the constitution in a peaceful and legal manner.

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