Acceso usuarios
David. M. Uhlmann
In tbe United States, the overwhelming majority of environmental violations are committed by business es, which raises questions about when corporations sbould be prosecuted for environmental crimes. I argue tbat both corporations and indioiduals sbould be held accountable for environmental crimes but that prosecutors sbould exercise tbeir discretion to ensure tbat criminal prosecution is reserued for the most egregious environmental uiolations. In tbis article, I review the broad doctrine of corporate criminalliability in the United States, which allows corporations to be held uicariously responsible for tbe acts of tbeir employees or agents, i/ committed within the scope of the employment or agency and [or the benefu of the corporation. I address how prosecutors exercise their discretion to narrow tbe broad scope 01corporate criminalliability and why reliance on prosecutonal discretion makes more sense than proposed reforms to corporate criminallaw that would focus on the role of senior rnanagement and/or a compliance program defense. I explain why prosecuting corporations is essential to environmental protection through lato, euen though corporations cannot be jailed, because corporate criminal prosecution serues retributiue, utilitarian, and expressiue purposes of punishment
Part 1: Corporate criminal liability and environmental crime. - Part II: The exercise of prosecutorial discretion for corporate environmental crime. - Part III Proposed reforms of corporate criminalliability and the implications for environmental criminal enforcement. - Part IV: The retributive, utilitarian, and expressive role of corporate criminalliability. - Conclusion.
