The Highest Good and the Practical Regulative Knowledge in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason

• Autores: Joel Thiago Klein
• Localización: Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, ISSN-e 2386-7655, Nº. 3, 2016, págs. 210-230
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper I defend three different points: first, that the concept of highest good is derived from an a priori but subjective argument, namely a maxim of pure practical reason; secondly, that the theory regarding the highest good has the validity of a practical regulative knowledge; and thirdly, that the practical regulative knowledge can be understood as the same “holding something to be true” as Kant attributes to hope and believe.

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