A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences

• John A. Weymark ^[1]
  1. [1] Vanderbilt University

     Vanderbilt University

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, ISSN 1869-4195, Vol. 2, Nº. 4, 2011 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Special Issue in Honor of Salvador Barberà), págs. 529-550
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s13209-011-0064-5
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• Resumen

  • This article establishes versions of Moulin’s (Public Choice 35:437–455, 1980) characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain consists of all profiles of single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary subset of the real line. Two results are established that show that the median of 2n + 1 numbers can be expressed using a combination of minimization and maximization operations applied to subsets of these numbers when either these subsets or the numbers themselves are restricted in a particular way. These results are used to show how Moulin’s characterizations of generalized median social choice functions can be obtained as corollaries of his characterization of min–max social choice functions.