Voting over law enforcement: mission impossible

• Hakan İnal ^[1]
  1. [1] Izmir University

     Izmir University

     Turquía

     
• Localización: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, ISSN 1869-4195, Vol. 6, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 349-360
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s13209-015-0128-z
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • Median voter theorem has been used in many economic environments including law enforcement. Assumptions of the median voter theorem, however, are generally violated in law enforcement models. Moreover, it is impossible to have agents with “opposite equilibrium preferences” over enforcement levels in law enforcement models. These limitations on the use of preferences over law enforcement raises questions about the robustness and validity of law enforcement models.