Acceso usuarios
Why do states cooperate during international financial crises? A prominent account of such phenomena is provided by the Open Economy Politics approach, which advocates a methodological reductionism that focuses on domestic interests and institutions as explanatory drivers of foreign economic policy. I argue that the appropriateness and utility of this approach diminishes in two important contexts: when levels of economic interdependence and international institutionalization are both high; and when international insecurity is rising. Since the second condition has greater generality in international relations, I test it by focusing on a period when international economic institutionalization was much lower than today: the pre-1914 gold standard system. I show that as levels of interstate rivalry and insecurity rose in the years before 1914, so too did the role of strategic considerations in the international financial policies of the major European powers. The utility of the Open Economy Politics approach for explaining foreign financial policy is therefore contingent on an evolving international context. The argument is of considerable relevance to the contemporary era, when a rapidly evolving international political environment is again reshaping international financial policies.
