Acceso usuarios
The European Union (EU) has been a critical player in international environmental negotiations, especially those relating to climate change. This has been documented, and the role of the EU analysed, in many studies, some of which focus specifically on the role of European non-state actors in these negotiations. Yet few studies have analysed the role played by sub-state actors, namely government departments in the member states and directorate-generals in the European Commission. This paper attempts to redress this imbalance by considering the behaviour of the EU in the international climate negotiations through the prism of a ‘two-level’ game. In particular, it will consider what role sub-state actors played in determining the negotiating position of the EU and the type of agreement it has been willing to sign. In doing so, this paper reveals that there are limits to what the two-level game can explain, especially in long negotiations, and it suggests three factors that existing theories need to take into account to understand variations in state behaviour and its implication for negotiation outcomes.
