Acceso usuarios
Peter Söderlund
This study examines if prime minister's parties are punished or rewarded by voters to a lesser extent in candidate-centred electoral systems compared to party-centred systems. Candidate-centred systems allow the voters greater choice in determining the fate of individual candidates at the district level and create incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote rather than pursuing a party vote. Voters in these systems are more likely to focus on individual candidates than on parties, thus fostering individual accountability at the expense of collective (party) accountability. Cross-sectional time-series data for 23 OECD countries between 1961 and 2014 were analysed. Two indices of intraparty efficiency (the Farrell–McAllister Index and the Shugart Index) were used to capture the candidate-centredness of electoral systems. The analysis of aggregate-level data with almost 300 observations showed that incumbent parties tend to win or lose fewer votes in candidate-centred electoral systems. This effect has become stronger over time. Candidate-centredness has a weak moderating impact on the state of the economy on the degree of public sanctioning of government parties.
