Patentes y hold-up: la acción de cesación ante compromisos FRAND

• Autores: Aurea Suñol Lucea
• Localización: Indret: Revista para el Análisis del Derecho, ISSN-e 1698-739X, Nº. 4, 2015
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • En este trabajo se examina si el compromiso que suelen asumir los titulares de patentes esenciales para un estándar en el seno de organización privadas de adopción de estándares a conceder licencias en términos justos, razonables y no discriminatorios (FRAND) implica una renuncia a ejercitar la acción de cesación de la conducta (eventualmente) infractora de la patente por parte de los adoptantes del estándar, lo cual negamos; cuándo es oportuno que los tribunales denieguen su concesión; y cuál es la normativa más adecuada (la legislación de patentes, el Derecho de obligaciones y contratos o el Derecho de la competencia) para articular el control del ejercicio de la acción de cesación por parte del titular de una patente, desde un punto de vista práctico y de policy. En este último sentido concluimos que la legislación de patentes es el mejor mecanismo a tal fin, y que los tribunales nacionales (incluidos los españoles) estaban obligados a denegar la acción de cesación solicitada por el titular de la patente cuando a la vista de las circunstancias del caso su concesión resulte desproporcionado.

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