La economía política del tamaño del Estado

• Autores: Mireya Bermeo Álvarez
• Localización: Revista CIFE: Lecturas de Economía Social, ISSN-e 2248-4914, Vol. 15, Nº. 22, 2013, págs. 87-108
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.15332/s2248-4914.2013.0022.04
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • Este documento ofrece un análisis crítico de las definiciones de los determinantes po- líticos del tamaño del Estado, entendido como el gasto público del Gobierno nacional que se vincula a diferentes variables políticas más que económicas. Así, el gasto público corresponde con los deseos, solicitudes o demanda de los votantes por redistribución, y a su vez los gobernantes buscan maximizar su propio beneficio. Esta investigación se aparta de la concepción de un gobierno benefactor o benevolente, cuyo propósito fundamental es buscar la maximización del bienestar social.

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