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In this response to Mónica García-Salmones Rovira's article "The Politics of Interest in International Law", the argument is developed that an interpretation of Kelsen's legal theory as founded on "interests" or "conflicts of interests" is not adequately supported by the primary materials, if read in their context. "Interests" do not play a major role in Kelsen's writings, and where they are discussed, they do not form part of his legal theory, i.e., the Pure Theory of Law. This response argues that this "context insensibility" in reading Kelsen may have its roots in the unwitting adoption of one over-arching method of scholarly cognition. It thereby implicitly discards one of the crucial axioms of Kelsen's theory of scholarship: the avoidance of a syncretism of methods through a consistent separation of scholarly enterprises and methods. Not to adopt such a separation is a legitimate stance; to foist the non-separation on an author whose theory hinges upon it is not.
