How does the Court of Justice reason? What interpretative techniques is it using to arrive at its conclusions? In itself, this topic may appear somewhat theoretical and dry. However, if coupled with the issue of judicial legitimacy and normative debate about the "proper" way for a court to reason, a heated debate ignites quickly amongst all lawyers, not just a few jurisprudential devotees. Perhaps as a sign of the times, both issues, judicial reasoning and the legitimacy of the Court of Justice, are coming to the fore (again). This review essay critically examines a recent addition to the debate: Gunnar Beck's The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). First, by the way of introduction, the main threads of the past debates on the judicial method in the Court are recalled. Secondly, the key arguments of the reviewed book are outlined with a few critical reflections added. Thirdly, some broader reflections on the debates on judicial method of the Court are offered, zooming in on one or perhaps the recurring question in particular: the pro-Union interpretative tendency in the reasoning of the Court and its limits.