Isaac Kfir
Robert Johnson�s The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight is a book that should be particularly read by military and civilian personnel deploying to Afghanistan, even though it is not designed to be a policy guide (p. 4). Although Johnson�s analysis of the Taliban period and the post-2001 US-led invasion is weak, overall the book delivers a thoughtful analysis of how and why Afghans fight, making it clear that conceptions of �friends and enemies� carry different implications for Afghans than for westerners, as Afghans are highly conscious of prevailing circumstances. The appeal of the book is that it examines whether an Afghan �way of war� exists and if so what motivates and drives it. To Johnson, the �Afghan way of war� is based on topography, culture, opponents� strengths and weaknesses, financial inducement and religion. Although taking an historical approach, Johnson is careful about drawing lessons from history, arguing that historical assessments ��convey values that have been discredited in the West,� (p. 301). An added benefit of the book is Johnson�s willingness to investigate Afghan domestic wars and not restrict the study to how the Afghans engaged foreigners, allowing him to declare ��there was no single Afghan way of war in the country�s history. Every response has been dependent on the situation that confronted the Afghans,� (p. 36). This may explain why Johnson seems to reject the perception that when it comes to Afghanistan guerrillas do not have an added advantage on conventional forces as these forces, whether Taliban or Mujahedeen, have to contend with a chaotic command and control system, disloyalty, rivalry, poor discipline, assassination threats and weak logistics (p. 303). Johnson�s meticulous research allows him to highlight that whether during the First Anglo-Afghan War or the Afghan wars of the mid-nineteenth century, which occurred mainly between �