Acceso usuarios
Andrew W. Martin, Steven H. Lopez, Vincent J. Roscigno, Randy Hodson
Organizational scandals have become all too commonplace; from investment firms' financial improprieties to sexual abuse cover-ups, rule-breaking has become a "normal" feature of organizational life. Although there is considerable scholarly work on rule-breaking, efforts to explain it remain theoretically fragmented. Here we identify two fundamental dimensions of bureaucratic rule-breaking and develop a coherent theoretical conception of it as a structurally patterned and interactionally mediated sociological fact. First, rule-breaking may be permitted or contested by those charged with rule enforcement. Manifestations of rule-breaking take on a routine character only where it is unofficially allowed; where it is not, conflict ensues. Second, the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy is mirrored by an organizational hierarchy of rule-breaking. Rule-breaking can be undertaken by individuals acting alone, it can be coordinated by workgroups, or it can be organized by top management as a matter of unofficial policy. Considering how these two dimensions of rule-breaking interact provides insight into how such actions vary with respect to the full range of organizational cross-pressures. Finally, the framework we develop offers an important corrective to the overreliance on the formal aspects of Weber's theorizing about bureaucracy and has considerable utility for generating hypotheses across an array of institutional arenas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
