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How should judges be selected? This normative query lies at the heart of a fundamental debate occurring among academics, lawyers, interest groups, politicians, and political observers. Of course, a variety of selection systems exist in the American states�partisan judicial elections, nonpartisan judicial elections, merit selection with retention elections, and appointment�and empirical political scientists are increasingly evaluating many of the claims advanced by individuals (e.g., former Justice Sandra Day O�Connor) and groups (e.g., Justice at Stake, American Judicature Society) who oppose judicial elections on the normative grounds that elections represent a fundamental threat to bedrock principles such as judicial independence, judicial impartiality, and the legitimacy of courts. James L. Gibson�s Electing Judges directly confronts this core contention with a focus on the public�s perceptions of these issues.
In this tour de force in the realm of state courts, judicial elections, and institutional legitimacy, Gibson presents a multifaceted examination of whether elections and campaign activities undermine the institutional legitimacy of state courts. He employs survey experiments, observational survey data, and dynamic panel data. The book relies heavily on survey data from Kentucky surrounding its 2006 judicial elections, though some analyses are replicated using national data. Gibson should be applauded for using multiple research designs to examine the overarching research question. It enhances the overall evidentiary potency of his arguments.
To paraphrase the book�s subtitle, some �surprising effects� emerge from Gibson�s analysis. I will highlight the main ones. First, in chapter 2, which I found to be the most important and interesting analysis in the book, Gibson reports evidence from a survey experiment�in both Kentucky and a national sample�testing �
